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Notes
A Proposal for Legislative Effectuation of
Double Jeopardy Protection
by
KEVIN A. HICKS*
"[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb."'
In North Carolina v. Pearce 2 the United States Supreme Court held
that the double jeopardy clause provides three distinct constitutional pro-
tections. First, it prohibits a second prosecution for the same crime after
acquittal. Second, it prohibits a second prosecution for the same crime
after conviction. Third, it prohibits multiple punishment for the same
offense.3 The most vexatious aspect of the double jeopardy clause is the
task of defining "the same offense." Frequently, a single criminal act can
result in numerous statutory violations. To introduce the scope of the
problem, suppose a woman uses a firebomb to destroy her own property
in attempting an insurance fraud and in the process causes two adjacent
buildings to burn. At the outset it is not entirely clear whether she
should be tried and punished separately for the insurance fraud and each
of three arsons. Using an abstract notion of "offense," one might argue
that if only one arson were the means of the insurance fraud, and the
others were unintended consequences, then they are all simply aspects of
the same offense. The fraud and the unintended arsons should merge
with the original arson for double jeopardy purposes. One might suppose
further that the woman could be tried three more times for possessing,
transporting, and using an illegal incendiary device.4 Even if the insur-
ance fraud and the unintended arsons do not merge with the original
* A.B. 1986, University of California, Berkeley; Member, Third Year Class.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
3. Id at 717 (footnotes omitted).
4. It should also be noted that notions of sovereignty might allow punishment in both
federal and state jurisdictions. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 329-30 (1978)
("[P]rosecutions ... brought by separate sovereigns ... are not 'for the same offence,' and the
Double Jeopardy Clause thus does not bar one when the other has occurred." (quoting U.S.
CoNsT. amend. V)).
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arson, should the offenses involving incendiary devices merge with the
arson? Should the offense of possessing the firebomb merge with the of-
fense of transporting it?
This Note first examines the existing state of the double jeopardy
protection against multiple punishment for the same offense and finds the
protection lost in an abyss between Congress and the courts.5 The
United States Supreme Court, perhaps justifiably, has relegated double
jeopardy responsibility to Congress-but Congress has not responded.
Section I of this Note reviews the Court's struggle vis-a-vis its role in
double jeopardy protection, pointing out the dilemmas that have led to,
and perhaps forced, the Court's present stance. Section II argues that
there is no simple judicial test for affording adequate protection against
double jeopardy. Section III suggests that the best prospect for success
in achieving this goal lies in an intensive legislative re-examination of
criminal statutes. For each situation in which contemporaneous "same
offense" double jeopardy problems may occur, Congress and state legisla-
tors must confront specifically the question as to which crimes will merge
under what circumstances. Finally, the Note examines different theoreti-
cal approaches to the problem, arguing that the primary factor in making
these judgments should be the intent of the offender.
I. Evolution of the Supreme Court's Analysis: Early Choices
and Ultimate Abdication
When the United States Supreme Court first accepted the opportu-
nity to set forth the meaning of "same offense," the result was an attrac-
tively simple test comparing the elements of the offenses charged. The
Court did not expressly give the "Blockburger test" constitutional im-
port, but for many years the Court seemed to consider it tightly linked to
the double jeopardy clause. In the end, however, the Court came face to
face with a latent weakness in the Blockburger test and definitively de-
clared it to be merely a tool of statutory construction, to be implemented
only in the absence of evidence or contrary legislative intent.
A. The Blockburger Test
In Blockburger v. United States6 the United States Supreme Court
for the first time addressed the dilemma faced by courts in deciding what
constitutes "the same offense" for double jeopardy purposes. A jury
found that the defendant had sold morphine illegally on two occasions
5. For simplicity of analysis, this discussion focuses on federal jurisdiction. Some states
provide statutory protections against double jeopardy that may go beyond what the United
States Constitution requires. See infra note 114. To the extent that states do not provide such
protections, the discussion herein applies equally to the states.
6. 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
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and that on the second occasion he had done so in violation of two stat-
utes.7 Specifically, not only had he sold the contraband without a
stamped package, 8 but he also had sold it without a written prescription.9
Having been sentenced consecutively for the violations, the defendant ar-
gued that, the sentences violated his constitutional protection against
double jeopardy.10
The Court could have dealt with this issue using a number of differ-
ent conceptual approaches. First, the Court could have attempted to de-
cipher the legislative intent. Were the statutes designed such that anyone
who sells morphine unlawfully should be sentenced to five years, and
anyone brazen enough to sell it unwrapped was to serve an additional
five years? Or was the statute designed to give law enforcement officials
multiple means to detect and stem illegal narcotics traffic? The Court
did not explore legislative intent, but only stated cryptically that "Itihe
statute is not aimed at sales of the forbidden drugs qua sales, a matter
entirely beyond the authority of Congress, but at sales of such drugs in
violation of [the written order and stamped package requirements.]""
Second, the Court could have attempted to define "the same of-
fense" in physical terms. That is, it could have held that the act defines
the offense and that when the same conduct violates two or more prohibi-
tions, the offender may be convicted and punished only once, presumably
according to the terms of the most severe proscription. This approach
has been called the "same transaction test."' 12
Third, the Court could have tested double jeopardy against the mind
of the offender, asking whether he consciously attempted two illegal
objectives at once, or only one.
The Court, however, applied simple evidentiary analysis, holding
that, "where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two
distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether
there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires
proof of an additional fact which the other does not."'13 Thus, the Court
upheld the imposition of consecutive sentences, citing Morey v. Common-
7. d at 301.
8. In violation of 26 U.S.C. § 692 (1914) (amended by Act of Aug. 16, 1954, ch. 736,
§ 68A, Stat. 550; Act of Aug. 31, 1954, ch. 1147, § 8, 68 Stat. 1004, (codified as 26 U.S.C.
§ 4704), repealed by Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1292 (1970)).
9. In violation of 26 U.S.C. § 696 (1914) (amended by Act of Aug. 16, 1954, ch. 736,
68A Stat. 551; Act of Aug. 31, 1954, ch. 1147, §§ 6, 7, 68 Stat. 1003; Act of Aug. 1, 1956, ch.
852, § 12(c), 70 Stat. 909 (codified as 26 U.S.C. § 4705), repealed by Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84
Stat. 1292 (1970)).
10. Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 301.
11. Ida at 304.
12. See, eg., Kirchheimer, The Act, the Offense and Double Jeopardy, 58 YALE L.J. 513,
534 (1949).
13. Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304. Applying this test, the Court rejected the challenge to
the defendant's consecutive sentences. Id
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wealth, 14 a Massachusetts Supreme Court decision. Neither decision,
however, provided an articulated rationale for the same-evidence test.
B. Subsequent Application of Blockburger
As simple as the Blockburger rule may appear, the Court faced diffi-
culties in applying the test. One problem involved the "unit-of-offense"
issue. Multiple unit violations, as distinct from multiple statute viola-
tions, arise when the same statute is violated more than once, but the
conduct arguably constitutes only one offense. For example, the cultiva-
tion of fifteen marijuana plants probably constitutes one offense, not
fifteen.
(1) The Court's Apparent Withdrawal
In United States v. Universal C.L T. Credit Corp.,15 the Court en-
countered a unit-of-offense problem in which the government sought
thirty-two 10,000 dollar fines against an employer for violations of the
Fair Labor Standards Act. 16 The government alleged that certain viola-
tions had occurred weekly. For instance, counts seven through twenty-
six of the information charged one overtime violation per week for
twenty weeks. A strict application of Blockburger would permit the
twenty counts because each count required proof that a given employee
worked more than forty hours in a given week. 17
Rather than applying the Blockburger analysis, however, the Court
examined the legislative history of the Act and determined that the unit
of offense was "a course of conduct," 18 and that "the statute ... treats as
one offense all violations that arise from that singleness of thought, pur-
pose or action, which may be deemed a single 'impulse.' "19 The Court
reached this result despite the fact that, as Justice Douglas noted in dis-
sent, "[t]he Act does not speak of 'course of conduct.' That is the
Court's terminology, not the Act's." 20
14. 108 Mass. 433 (1871). Morey was convicted of "lewd and lascivious cohabitation"
with a woman not his wife and was sentenced to two years at hard labor. Since he was married
to Mrs. Morey at the time of the events in question, he was subsequently convicted of adultery
as well, and was sentenced to an additional three years at hard labor. The court permitted the
consecutive sentences to stand, finding that the difference between the two crimes is that the
former required proof of cohabitation and the latter required proof that the defendant was
married to someone other than his accomplice. Id. at 433-34.
15. 344 U.S. 218 (1952).
16. 29 U.S.C. §§ 202(a)(1), 215, 216(a) (1940).
17. See Universal C.LT Credit Corp., 344 U.S. at 220 n.3.
18. Id. at 224.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 226 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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Another apparent break with Blockburger occurred in Bell v. United
States,21 in which the defendant pleaded guilty to two violations of the
Mann Act.22 The Act forbade the transportation of any female across
state lines for immoral purposes, and Bell was charged with violating it
twice by transporting two women at once in the same vehicle. The Court
readily admitted that Congress could have provided for consecutive pun-
ishment for each woman transported, but found that the statute was am-
biguous as to the unit of prosecution.2 3 The Court reached this
conclusion despite the fact that the Act prohibited the transport of "any
woman or girl" 24 when it could have been written to forbid the transport
of "women or girls."
Applying the Blockburger test to the facts of Bell, one would find
two offenses: In count (1) the government would have to prove that Bell
transported Ms. A; in count (2) that he transported Ms. B. Thus, each
count would require proof of a fact (the particular woman transported)
that the other count would not. Faced with the "ambiguity," however,
the Court reasoned that it should be "resolved in favor of lenity, ' ' 25 and
applied the interpretation most favorable to the defendant. The Court
did not mention why it did not apply the Blockburger analysis, nor that
application of that test would have forced an opposite holding.
(2) Blockburger Reaffirmed
Against this apparent slide away from Blockburger, the Court de-
cided to hear Gore v. United States26 for the express purpose of determin-
ing whether Blockburger's authority had been "impaired. ' 27 The
government charged Gore with essentially the same violations that
Blockburger had faced, as well as a third. In one transaction, the defend-
ant sold narcotics without written authorization 28 and not in the original
stamped package.29 He also violated a third statute by facilitating the
concealment and sale of the narcotics knowing that they had been ille-
gally imported.30
Justice Frankfurter wrote the five-to-four decision reaffirming
Blockburger and approving its application against Gore. He first at-
21. 349 U.S. 81 (1955).
22. 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (1949) (amended by Pub. L. No. 99-628, § 5(b)(1) (1986)).
23. Bell, 349 U.S. at 82-83.
24. 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (1949) (emphasis added).
25. Bell, 349 U.S. at 83.
26. 357 U.S. 386 (1958).
27. Id. at 388.
28. 26 U.S.C. § 4705(a) (Supp. V 1954), repealed by Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1292
(1970).
29. 26 U.S.C. § 4704(a) (Supp. V 1954), repealed by Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1292
(1970).
30. 21 U.S.C. § 174 (1925), repealed by Pub. L. 91-513, § I101(a)(2), (4), 84 Stat. 1291
(1970).
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tempted to excuse the Blockburger Court for not incorporating legislative
history into its opinion by observing that the Blockburger Court was fa-
miliar with the history of narcotics legislation, and that at the time of the
Blockburger decision it simply "was not customary to make the whole
legislative history . . . part of the conventional apparatus of an
opinion. ' 31
Justice Frankfurter then made the jurisprudentially suspect argu-
ment that Blockburger is all the more valid because Justices Brandeis,
Butler, and Roberts, noted for their ardor in protecting defendants from
unlawful actions of the state, did not dissent from it.32 Finally, the ma-
jority reached the legislative intent question and simply inferred that
Congress must have intended cumulative punishment because it enacted
the statutes at different times and therefore were attempting to "turn the
screw of the criminal machinery-detection, prosecution and punish-
ment-tighter and tighter. ' 33 While this inference is plausible, it does
not seem necessarily more probable than an alternate conclusion that
Congress enacted the later laws merely to close loopholes and further
circumscribe the real evil: the unlawful sale of narcotics.
Frankfurter's reasoning logically leads to the opposite conclusion in
yet another way. Because the statutes were passed at different times, it
could be argued that the drafters did not recognize the multiple-violation
possibilities. As Professor Kirchheimer has noted, "[Legislators'] work
is transmitted from one generation to another in piecemeal fashion...
quite often without bothering to weed out obsolete [statutes] or to har-
monize the old with the new." '34
Justice Frankfurter did not explain why the unit-of-offense cases
such as Bell did not weaken Blockburger, but merely restated their hold-
ings without noting the conceptual similarity between the multiple unit
violation and the multiple statute violation. In both situations, all counts
alleged usually satisfy the Blockburger test because each "count" or
"crime" requires proof of a fact that the others do not. The majority did
not explain why, when faced with legislative ambiguity, the rule of lenity
should apply to the former (the Mann Act) and the stricter Blockburger
result to the latter. As Chief Justice Warren observed in dissent:
Normally these are not problems that receive explicit legislative con-
sideration. But this fact should not lead the judiciary, charged with
the obligation of construing these statutes, to settle such questions by
31. Gore, 357 U.S. at 388. One is hard-put, however, to find an era in which the Court
customarily described the whole legislative history of statutes. Indeed, the statement is partic-
ularly curious since Blockburger itself, in declaring the purpose of the legislation in question,
cited Nigro v. United States, 276 U.S. at 332 (1928), a case in which the Court made extensive
reference and speculation as to Congressional intent.
32. Gore, 357 U.S. at 389.
33. Id. at 390.
34. Kirchheimer, supra note 12, at 515-16.
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the easy application of stereotyped formulae. It is. . too easy and too
arbitrary to apply a presumption for or against multiple punishment in
all cases or even to do so one way in one class of cases and the other
way in another. Placing a case in the category of unit-of-offense
problems or the category of overlapping-statute problems may point
up the issue, but it does not resolve it.35
In sum, the Blockburger doctrine, originally propounded without
substantial analysis, was reaffirmed in Gore without significantly more
analysis. Probably the most reasoned and prophetic aspect of the opin-
ion is its final paragraph in which the majority notes that "these are pe-
culiarly questions of legislative policy"3 6 and that the Court did not have
the power to revise sentences.31 Apparently the Court anticipated that
absent legislative guidance, future judicial determinations applying the
Blockburger test would be fraught with difficulties.
C. Defining the Role of the Blockburger Test
Neither Blockburger nor Gore clearly defined the role of the Block-
burger test. The question remained whether the test is merely a rule of
statutory construction for resolving ambiguity or whether it is the em-
bodiment of the double jeopardy clause's protection against unconstitu-
tional multiple punishment. For illustration, suppose that Congress
passes two statutes. Statute A reads, "Whoever deliberately does X shall
be guilty of crime A and shall be imprisoned not more than five years."
Statute B reads, "Whoever violates statute A shall be guilty of crime B
and shall be imprisoned not more than five years." Facially, this pair of
statutes appears to authorize up to ten years' imprisonment for doing X.
They would violate the Blockburger test, however, because crime B does
not require proof of anything not already required for proof of crime A.
At least a few justices apparently assumed that cumulative punish-
ment in this situation would be prohibited by the double jeopardy clause
because the offenses would not pass the Blockburger test and an offender
would receive multiple punishments for the same offense. In Brown v.
Ohio, 38 Justice Powell, writing for a four-justice plurality, stated that the
purpose of the Blockburger test was to determine "whether two offenses
are sufficiently distinguishable to permit the imposition of cumulative
punishment."'3 9 In Simpson v. United States,40 the Court considered
whether the defendant could be punished cumulatively for aggravated
robbery "by the use of a dangerous weapon or device"4' and committing
35. Gore, 357 U.S. at 394 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
36. Id. at 393.
37. Id.
38. 432 U.S. 161 (1977).
39. I at 166.
40. 435 U.S. 6 (1978).
41. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (1959).
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a federal felony using a firearm.42 Justice Brennan, writing for an eight-
justice majority reversing such a sentence, repeated the language from
Brown v. Ohio and added:
The Blockburger test has its primary relevance in the double jeopardy
context, where it is a guide for determining when two separately-de-
fined crimes constitute the "same offense" for double jeopardy pur-
poses.... Cases in which the government is able to prove violations of
two separate criminal statutes with precisely the same factual showing,
as here, raise the prospect of double jeopardy and the possible need to
evaluate the statutes in light of the Blockburger test.43
After Simpson it seemed probable, if not conclusive, that a majority
thought the Blockburger test to have constitutional import.
Justice Rehnquist, the lone dissenter in Simpson, insisted that the
Blockburger test did not arise from the Constitution, but is only a princi-
ple of statutory construction. 44 In critiquing the majority's reasoning, he
stated:
Certainly the language of the Double Jeopardy provision of the Fifth
Amendment, which prohibits a person from being twice put in jeop-
ardy of life or limb, has not the slightest application to this sort of
criminal prosecution. It is only by an overly refined analysis, which
first suggests that the double jeopardy prohibition encompasses en-
hancement of penalty for an offense for which there has been but one
trial, and then concludes that the plain language of Congress providing
for such enhancement shall not be read in that way in order to avoid
this highly theoretical problem, that the Court is able to reach the re-
sult it does.45
Only two terms later the Court's alignment in Whalen v. United
States46 suggested that at least three justices had moved to adopt the
view articulated by Justice Rehnquist in his Simpson dissent. In Whalen,
the trial court imposed consecutive sentences on the defendant for felony
murder and for the underlying felony of rape.47 The felony-murder stat-
ute was violated if a killing occurred in the course of any of six listed
felonies.48 In a rather curious decision on the merits, 49 the majority
42. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1968).
43. Simpson, 435 U.S. at 11.
44. Id. at 18 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 19.
46. 445 U.S. 684 (1980).
47. Id. at 685.
48. D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-2401 (1973).
49. A District of Columbia statute appeared on its face to reject specifically the Block-
burger rule in favor of one leaving cumulative punishment entirely to the trial court's discre-
tion. D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-112 (1973) provided in part, "A sentence ... shall, unless the
court imposing such sentence expressly provides otherwise, run consecutively to any other
sentence ... whether or not the offense ... arises out of the same transaction and requires proof
of a fact which the other does not" (emphasis added). The majority escaped an explicit deter-
mination of whether a legislature could constitutionally reject the Blockburger test by deciding
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seemed ultimately to accept the notion that, notwithstanding a contrary
result suggested by an application of the Blockburger test, Congress has
the last word on whether consecutive punishment is permitted. Thus,
the opinion assumed that the dispositive question was whether Congress
authorized consecutive punishment. Also, significantly, the opinion cited
Blockburger as a rule of statutory construction, making no mention of
any relationship between the Blockburger test and the double jeopardy
clause.50 Thus, the Court inched toward disconnecting the double jeop-
ardy clause from the question of cumulative punishment to the extent
such punishment is legislatively authorized. Nevertheless, the Court
seemed to reserve a double jeopardy trump card by instructing, "[t]he
Double Jeopardy Clause at the very least precludes federal courts from
imposing consecutive sentences unless authorized by Congress to do
SO."51
If the majority was not entirely forthcoming regarding the full
power of Congress to define offenses and prescribe cumulative punish-
ment, Justice Blackmun's concurrence and Justice Rehnquist's dissent
hastened to dispel any ambivalence. As Justice Blackmun stated, "I be-
lieve that the Court should take the opportunity.., to hold clearly that
the question of what punishments are constitutionally permissible is not
different from the question of what punishments the Legislative Branch
intended to be imposed."' 52 Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice
Burger, would have gone even further: "I believe that the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause should play no role whatsoever in deciding whether cumula-
tive punishments may be imposed under different statutes at a single
criminal proceeding. '53 Justice White, concurring, agreed with Justice
Rehnquist that "the question is one of statutory construction and does
not implicate the Double Jeopardy Clause. Had Congress authorized cu-
mulative punishment,.., imposition of such sentences would not violate
the Constitution."'54
that in enacting section 23-112, Congress really meant to adopt Blockburger. See Whalen, 445
U.S. at 691.
50. 445 U.S. at 691.
51. Id at 689; see also id at 701 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("[We] have just as often
hedged our bets with veiled hints that a legislature might offend the Double Jeopardy Clause
by authorizing too many separate punishments for any single 'act.' "); id. at 697 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring) ("Dicta in recent opinions of this Court at least have suggested, and I now think
wrongly, that the Double Jeopardy Clause may prevent the imposition of cumulative punish-
ments in situations in which the Legislative Branch clearly intended that multiple penalties be
imposed for a single criminal transaction.").
52. Whalen, 445 U.S. at 698 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
53. Id at 705 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). To this extent one must consider whether Jus-
tice Rehnquist might overrule or interpret differently the portion of North Carolina v. Pearce
holding that the double jeopardy clause "protects against multiple punishments for the same
offense." North Caroliiha v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969).
54. Whalen, 445 U.S. at 696 (White, J., concurring).
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The apparent ambiguity of the Court's reasoning in Whalen was re-
solved conclusively by Albernaz v. United States55 and Missouri v.
Hunter. 56 In Albernaz, the Court upheld consecutive sentences when the
defendants were found to have conspired at once both to import and
distribute marijuana in violation of two separate statutory provisions.7
Justice Rehnquist, writing for a six-justice majority, incorporated provi-
sions from the Whalen concurrences that rejected squarely any limita-
tions the double jeopardy clause might place on legislatively authorized
consecutive sentencing. The Court concluded with propositions seem-
ingly drawn 58 from the Whalen concurrences of Justices Blackmun59 and
White: 60 "Thus, the question of what punishments are constitutionally
permissible is not different from the question of what punishments the
Legislative Branch intended to be imposed. Where Congress intended
... to impose multiple punishments, imposition of such sentences does
not violate the Constitution. '61
In Missouri v. Hunter, 62 such statements left the realm of dicta and
anchored the Court's holding. The Hunter Court held that consecutive
sentences under Missouri law for first-degree robbery and for armed
criminal action did not violate the double jeopardy clause since the Mis-
souri Legislature clearly intended cumulative punishment and the Mis-
souri Supreme Court, applying Blockburger, found that the two statutes
proscribed "the same offense."' 63 Thus, its previous pronouncement in
North Carolina v. Pearce notwithstanding, 64 the Court seems to have
reached the conclusion that the double jeopardy clause does not preclude
multiple punishment for the same offense, at least to the extent a legisla-
ture has prescribed such punishment.
II. There Is No Talisman
What considerations might have led the Court apparently to reduce
the status of the Blockburger test? This section suggests that the test was
destined to crumble when faced with its inherent flaws. This section also
argues that no judicial test could successfully replace it. In fact, beyond
discerning legislative intent, the Court was left with no means of review-
55. 450 U.S. 333 (1981).
56. 459 U.S. 359 (1983).
57. 21 U.S.C. 21 §§ 846, 963 (1970).
58. The Court did not attribute the source of these propositions.
59. Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 696 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
60. Id. at 695 (White, J., concurring).
61. Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 344 (1981).
62. 459 U.S. 359 (1983).
63. Id. at 363-64, 368. The Missouri Supreme Court therefore set aside the conviction for
armed criminal action, believing it to violate the United States Constitution. The state ap-
pealed. Id.
64. See supra notes 3, 53 and accompanying text.
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ing the multiple punishment question of what should be the appropriate
punishment for a given criminal activity.
From a practical standpoint, the Court's apparent deference to legis-
lators on the question of multiple punishment for crimes arising out of
the same transaction or occurrence seems reasonable and inevitable. At-
tempting to determine what constitutes "the same offense" under the
double jeopardy clause may be an inappropriate subject for substantive
judicial review in the consecutive punishment context. 65 It may be
proper for appellate courts to determine whether an offender has been
punished according to the rule of law or, when needed, to settle a dispute
as to what the law is. It is another thing entirely, however, for courts to
second guess legislatively determined schemes of penology, except when
the eighth amendment's protection from cruel and unusual punishment
is at issue.6 6 Such attempts lead either to logically indefensible distinc-
tions or to unwarranted intrusions upon the legislative process.67
The Blockburger rule seems to have been just such an ill-reasoned
foray, despite its later interpretations. For example, the statutes at issue
in Missouri v. Hunter68 illustrate well the problems presented by such a
judicial rule. The Missouri first-degree robbery statute provided for a
minimum sentence of five years69 and the armed criminal action statute
provided for a minimum of three years.70 Since the latter required proof
of nothing not proved by the former, the Blockburger test, if applied,
would prohibit cumulating the minimum sentence to eight years. If the
legislature simply had provided for an eight-year minimum sentence for
first degree robbery, however, no constitutional question would have
arisen. That is, although an eight-year sentence under a single statute
would present no constitutional problem, the same eight-year sentence,
65. This statement is not intended to suggest that the judiciary should not engage actively
in the protection of defendants from unwarranted successive prosecutions. Extensive discus-
sion of this aspect of the double jeopardy protection is outside the scope of this Note. At
present, it appears that when the Blockburger test reveals two offenses, a defendant is only
protected from subsequent action by collateral estoppel. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436,
44247 (1970). To the extent that Congress and state legislators undertake to define "the same
offense" as proposed by this Note, however, the double jeopardy protection against successive
prosecution may be enhanced.
66. See Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 82 (1955).
67. Of course, the familiar counterargument to this justification of judicial deference as-
serts that the court should not back away from constitutional interpretation simply because it
would be complex or difficult. To the extent that this counterargument is persuasive in the
double jeopardy context, the judiciary should perhaps introduce and apply the principles out-
lined in section III(C). See infra notes 104-129 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, inter-
pretations of the "same offense" may uniquely warrant more judicial deference than should
other interpretive problems because Congress necessarily plays such a significant role in defin-
ing offenses. That is, an offense is what Congress says it is; otherwise it is not an offense.
68. 459 U.S. 359 (1983); see supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
69. Mo. RPv. STAT. §§ 560.120 (1969), 135 (Supp. 1975) (repealed 1977).
70. Mo. Rnv. STAT. § 559.225 (Supp. 1976) (repealed 1977).
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as combined under two statutes, would violate the Blockburger rule and
would be unconstitutional. Any distinction between the two schemes
hardly would seem to be of constitutional consequence. 71 And, of
course, such distinctions presumably would result if the Blockburger
"same-evidence" test operated with constitutional force.
Tests other than that laid out in Blockburger, however, do not ap-
pear to be significantly more helpful as constitutional distinctions be-
tween offenses. The "same-transaction" 72 test as a constitutional
standard leads to decisions based on value and policy judgments, since
the "same-transaction" easily escapes precise definition. For example,
consider a hypothetical mail fraud scheme in which the thief advertises
nationally to sell special glasses guaranteed to increase immensely the
ability of law students to "spot issues" on law school exams. Hundreds
of first-year law students send 19.99 dollars each for the "Excell-lenses"
and instead receive conventional theatre 3-D glasses. After scoring
poorly on their exams, they find that the thief has cashed their checks
and cannot be located. How many crimes have occurred? Rational ap-
plication of the same-transaction test yields at least three reasonable re-
sults. First, the whole scheme could be considered a single transaction.
Second, the false advertisement and the cashing of the checks could be
considered two transactions. Third, each instrument cashed could be
held to represent a separate transaction. In other words, the test only
replaces one ambiguity with another.
Moreover, the same-transaction test may fail to handle logically
problems similar to the problem in Missouri v. Hunter. An indefensible
distinction arises between a jurisdiction that would impose a twenty-year
sentence for robbery with a firearm and one that provides a ten-year sen-
tence for robbery and in a separate statute imposes an additional ten
years for committing a felony with a firearm. If the same-transaction test
were imposed in the latter jurisdiction, the defendant would receive only
a ten-year sentence for a crime that would receive a twenty-year sentence
in the former jurisdiction. Further, the same-transaction test may com-
promise legitimate ends of criminal justice. For instance, if a criminal
with full knowledge of the law deliberately intends, plans, and accom-
plishes two or more illegal objectives in a single transaction, he should
71. Nevertheless, the mere fact that the act leads to multiple convictions may achieve
great significance to the offender who thereby triggers repeat offender, RICO, or other provi-
sions that have sentence enhancement effects. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines presently
operate to prevent inconsistent consequences in such cases by "grouping" past offenses for
sentence enhancement purposes. The Guidelines, however, are not binding on the states,
which might take a different view of how to treat prior federal offenses when sentencing an
offender in a state court. See United States Sentencing Commission, FEDERAL SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL pp. 221-33 (West rev. ed. 1990).
72. See Kirchheimer, supra note 12, at 534.
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not be punished for only one crime simply because he was clever enough
to be an efficient criminal.
Another possible basis for distinguishing offenses asks whether the
two or more crimes alleged are intended to protect different societal in-
terests. For instance, if one proscription protects property ownership
and another protects life, then the two may be punished consecutively
under this analysis. Ultimately, however, the test would return to legis-
lative intent because definitions of a protected interest can reach any level
of specificity. In Blockburger and Gore, for example, the Court could
have reached a contrary result by finding that the offenses were merely
different means of protecting society from dangerous narcotics.
The "same-intent" or "same-objective" ("same-objective") test as a
constitutional standard would seem to approximate better common-sense
notions of what crime and punishment entail. That is, the acts by which
we seek to define criminality are only shadows of what we really wish to
deter, punish, segregate, or rehabilitate-the mens rea. Without at least
a minimal quantum of mens rea, the act is only unfortunate, not crimi-
nal. 73 The true concern of a penal system is the criminal mind's willing-
ness to disrupt the social order by disregarding the rules that protect it.
Thus, a perfectly omniscient judge or jury presumably would sentence
according to culpability rather than according to unintended conse-
quences of a criminal act.74
Unfortunately, a constitutionally based determination that a crimi-
nal cannot receive multiple punishment for multiple offenses committed
pursuant to a single objective in the same act or transaction creates
troublesome problems for the legal system. First, jurors would be ex-
pected to reach fine psychological distinctions based on inadequate facts.
In essence, they would have to become mind readers. To some extent the
jury already performs this task when it decides whether or not a defend-
ant manifested the required criminal intent. Direct or circumstantial in-
dicators of planning, motive, and volition, however; often aid the jury in
this determination. 75 Thus, distinguishing murder from manslaughter in
73. Mens rea is not always a precondition of criminal sanction. "[T]he debate surround-
ing [criminal] strict liability remains obstinately unresolved ...... Richardson, Strict Liability
for Regulatory Crime: The Empirical Research, 1987 CRIM. L. Rav. 295, 296. Even those who
support strict liability, however, do not generally argue that non-culpable states of mind
should be sanctioned. Instead, they debate whether the alleged non-culpable state of mind is in
fact non-culpable. See, e.g., Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal
Law, 33 STAN. L. REv. 591, 605-11 (1981) (pointing out that the perceived lack of culpability
in strict liability crimes may result from viewing an alleged criminal incident in too narrow a
time frame; looking at a broader time frame, one discovers the culpability).
74. See H. PACKER, THE LIMrrs OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 76 (1968) ("The ortho-
dox view is that culpability is primarily a matter of the actor's mental state rather than the
conduct in which he engages.").
75. Indeed, were such evidence entirely lacking, a defendant normally would be entitled
to a directed verdict of acquittal. See FED. R. CRiM. P. 29.
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a given case may entail speculation; but often the means of the death (for
example, the weapon used) may provide a ready index of premeditation.
A same-objective test involves even more obtuse subtleties. For in-
stance, the decision whether larceny, robbery, and assault may be pun-
ished cumulatively in a given case may turn largely upon undiscernible
mental states of the defendant. Thus, if a criminal runs into a conven-
ience store, grabs a fistful of cash from the register and knocks over a
clerk in his hasty escape, a range of crimes is possible. If bumping into
the clerk was accidental, only larceny may apply. If the criminal had
decided beforehand that he would do whatever was necessary to get away
with the money and, as expected, he had to run over the clerk, then
robbery would seem more appropriate. If the criminal is even more mali-
cious and, after taking the money, decides to assault the clerk unnecessa-
rily, then the larceny and assault might be divided accordingly. A
perceptive eyewitness might see no outward signs indicating a difference
among these three scenarios. The difference is entirely in the mind of the
criminal.
Another shortcoming of the same-objective test arises when one of
the offenses involved is an "enforcement" offense.76 The test then invites
an ignorance-of-the-law defense. Blockburger provides an illustration.
There, the defendant was convicted of selling regulated narcotics without
authorization and in violation of packaging laws. 77 Using the same-ob-
jective test, the defendant would have argued that he intended only to sell
drugs in violation of the law and was unaware of the specific packaging
laws. Therefore, because he intended to violate just one law, he should
be punished only once. Of course, this rationale is similar to the argu-
ment that since the defendant did not know the law, he should not be
punished for its violation.
Thus, with respect to common-law offenses, the same objective test
probably represents a worthy ideal, but is too difficult to apply on an
individualized basis and may be better reserved as a general principle of
legislation. 78  With respect to regulatory offenses, application of the
same objective rule collides with what may be a necessary fiction of mod-
ern civilization-that all citizens know the law. Further, to declare that
the same objective test is the embodiment of the double jeopardy clause
in its protection against multiple punishment would entail a radical break
from the rule of stare decisis, since the Court has never analyzed double
jeopardy in this fashion.79
76. In the context of this Note, an "enforcement offense" describes one seemingly innocu-
ous act or omission with the true aim of preventing other more culpable acts that otherwise
might be more difficult to detect or control. See infra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
77. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 301 (1932).
78. See infra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
79. In contrast, Justice Brennan has argued repeatedly and ardently that the same-trans-
action test should be the basis for the successive prosecution protection of the double jeopardy
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In summary, neither the same-evidence test, the same-transaction
test, nor the same-objective test provides an adequate principle for uni-
versal application in resolving the multiple offense question. Each, when
examined, leads to unfair, or at least undesirable, results. Deeper analy-
sis, however, inevitably leads to the ultimate legislative questions regard-
ing the appropriate punishment for a given offense or set of offenses.
Faced with this situation, it was reasonable for the Court to shift these
legislative questions to their proper forum.
I. Legislation Invited
Through its decisions in Whalen v. United States,80 Albernaz v.
United States,81 and Missouri v. Hunter, 82 the Court effectively has side-
stepped the question of double jeopardy protection against multiple pun-
ishment for the same offense. When Congress has spoken on the matter,
the question of multiple conviction and punishment is settled. When
Congress has not spoken, or has not done so clearly, the mechanical
Blockburger test nearly applies itself. Unfortunately for an accused,
however, the Blockburger "test" does not determine validly what the
Court has credited it with testing. The Court has described the test as
discerning legislative intent in the absence of "a determination of con-
trary legislative intent. ' 83 On the other hand, the test might just as rea-
sonably be interpreted as a talisman that allows the Court to avoid
deciphering legislative intent when the intent is not clearly apparent.
The Court could reach its decisions in this area by looking at
whatever evidence of legislative intent may exist; the societal interests
apparently protected; and the historical context of the enactment of the
statutes.84 Instead, the Court has been quick to apply the Blockburger
test, indicating that legislative intent must be "clear" before the Court
will dispense with the test.85 Thus, whatever the legislative intent truly
may be, unless Congress has clearly expressed it, the Blockburger talis-
man will provide its own estimation. 86
clause. See Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 170 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring); Ashe v. Swen-
son, 397 U.S. 436, 453-60 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).
80. 445 U.S. 684 (1980).
81. 450 U.S. 333 (1981).
82. 459 U.S. 359 (1983).
83. Albernaz 450 U.S. at 340.
84. See, eg., Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, 18 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(discussing the effect of the assassinations of 1968 on the Gun Control Act of that year).
85. See Hunter, 459 U.S. at 368; see also Albernaz, 450 U.S. at 340; Whalen, 445 U.S. at
691.
Note a subtle shift in analysis occurred in Albernaz. The Court applied Blockburger, 450
U.S. at 337, even before it mentioned whether or not any legislative intent could be found.
Albernaz, 450 U.S. at 340.
86. The Court has suggested, oddly enough, that since "Congress is 'predominantly a
lawyer's body,' and it is appropriate for us to assume that our elected representatives... know
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Rightly or wrongly, then, the Court has determined that it will
scratch only the surface in attempting to discover legislative intent. This
position places upon Congress the task of determining and explicitly de-
claring the circumstances authorizing consecutive convictions and
punishments.
A. A Step Toward Rationalizing Federal Sentencing Procedures: The
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984
Indirectly, Congress has begun to move toward legislative declara-
tiori of double jeopardy protection in passing the Comprehensive Crime
Control Act of 1984.87 In an effort to regulate sentencing procedures
under the federal criminal code,88 Congress created the United States
Sentencing Commission 9 and charged it with promulgating sentencing
guidelines and general policy statements regarding their application for
federal courts.90
Congress specified certain parameters for the Sentencing Commis-
sion9: that provided guidance for the Commission in treating the ques-
tion of consecutive terms of imprisonment. The sentencing guidelines
were to reflect "the general inappropriateness of imposing consecutive
terms of imprisonment" for a solicitation or conspiracy or both and the
"offense that was the sole object of the conspiracy or solicitation. ' 92 In
addition, the guidelines were to limit consecutive terms of imprisonment
for the violation of a general prohibition and a specific prohibition en-
compassed within it.93
The Commission responded with a procedure whereby counts are
"grouped" for sentencing when the counts involve "substantially the
same harm."'94 This "same harm" condition can be satisfied four ways:
(1) when the counts involve the same victim and the same act or transac-
tion; (2) when they involve the same victim and two or more acts con-
nected by a common scheme (including solicitation, conspiracy, and
the law," Congress must know Blockburger and that Congress intends its application. Al-
bernaz, 450 U.S. at 341-42 (citations omitted). This rationale is not persuasive, of course,
because its application and relation to the double jeopardy clause were unclear until Whalen or
Albernaz This proposition also tends to discredit the idea that the Blockburger test at its
origin discerned, or was designed to discern, legislative intent.
87. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (codified as amended in scattered titles and sections
of U.S.C.).
88. See 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (98 Stat.) 3184.
89. 28 U.S.C. § 991 (Supp. V 1987).
90. 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(1), (2) (Supp. V 1987). In Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct.
647 (1989), the Court upheld the constitutionality of the guidelines against the challenge that
the Commission was constituted in violation of the separation of powers principle.
91. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)-(v) (Supp. V 1987).
92. See id. § 994(l)(2).
93. See id. § 994(v).
94. See FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 71, § 3D1.2.
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attempt when two counts stem from a general-offense/specific-offense re-
lationship); (3) when one count represents a factor that the guidelines
already include in another count; and (4) when counts involve the "same
general type of offense" and the guidelines for that type of offense assess
its gravity in quantitative terms (for example, narcotic offenses that are
considered more severe according to the amount involved).95
To make the procedure more clear in its intended application, the
Commission provided illustrations of the operation of the guidelines for
multiple counts.96 The examples illuminate what the Commission means
by "substantially the same harm." For instance, when a defendant is
convicted of forging and cashing the same check, the counts are
grouped. 97 When the defendant is convicted of kidnapping and assault-
ing the victim during the course of the kidnapping, the counts also are
grouped. 98 When a defendant rapes the same victim on different days,
however, the counts are not grouped. 99
In general, the guidelines go far to ensure protection against multi-
ple punishments for the same offense and to preempt the application of
the Blockburger test. They take a realistic view of criminal transactions
and place motive and intent at the forefront of determinations of consec-
utive imprisonment.100
B. The Commission and "The Same Offense"
Although the sentencing guidelines in certain respects provide sig-
nificant double jeopardy protection, it is not because they were designed
specifically to do so. As indicated by the Commission, Congress in-
tended the guidelines to achieve honesty, uniformity, and proportionality
in sentencing. 101 The double jeopardy protections appear to be only de-
rivative. Since the Commission was not charged with the articulation of
double jeopardy standards, it is not surprising that gaps remain.
The Commission's steps in providing double jeopardy protection,
however, suggest a very interesting possibility: perhaps the Sentencing
Commission should be authorized to propose double jeopardy protec-
95. See id § 3D1.2 (a)-(d).
96. See generally id ch. 3 (D) (containing extensive commentary in the form of
examples).
97. Id. at 3.14.
98. Id.
99. Id at 3.15.
100. The guidelines do not reduce the length of sentences of imprisonment in any absolute
sense. While they reduce the possibility of consecutive imprisonment when multiple violations
of a statute occur, they reflect a clear intent to ensure, for instance, that "career offenders"
serve imprisonment terms "at or near the maximum term authorized." 28 U.S.C. § 994(h)
(1984), implemented in FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 71, ch. 4
(B). The guidelines also operate effectively to lengthen actual time served because they abolish
parole. See FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 71, at 2.
101. Id.
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tions in the same manner in which it promulgates the guidelines. Since
the Commission already implicitly approximates definition of the "same
offense" for cumulative imprisonment purposes, it seems well-suited to
do so expressly for double jeopardy purposes. Further, with at least
three of its seven voting members selected from the federal judiciary, the
statutory membership of the Commission reflects expertise in criminal
jurisprudence. 1 0 2
If Congress delegates its double jeopardy responsibilities to the
Commission, it must address two important matters. First, the present
arrangement between Congress and the Commission provides that
amendments to the guidelines will take effect automatically 180 days af-
ter submission to Congress unless a law is enacted to the contrary. 0 3
The articulation of protections of constitutional import, however, should
not be left to passive legislation, but should occur pursuant only to af-
firmative enactment. A study by the Commission should be merely a
starting point.
Second, the process by which the Commission defines "same of-
fense" requires closer scrutiny. The approach presently used by the
Commission, while achieving results far superior to the previous state of
affairs, fails in certain respects to focus adequately on the mind of the
offender in identifying "offenses." Of course, the guidelines were not
designed to identify "offenses" any more than they were designed to ar-
ticulate double jeopardy protections. The principles used by the Com-
mission to address the consecutive imprisonment question, however,
parallel closely this Note's proposal for identifying "offenses" for double
jeopardy purposes.
C. A Same Offense Standard for Double Jeopardy
Given that a clear expression of legislative intent has been implicitly
invited by the Court and is desirable to further the goals of double jeop-
ardy protection, the question turns to the substance of this legislation.
This section discusses various possibilities and ends with a recommended
analysis examining scenarios under which multiple offenses can be ex-
pected to occur, focusing primarily on the intent of the offender.
(1) The Same Evidence Test
Before proposing an alternative analysis, however, one should ask
whether Congress would desire a different analysis than the same-evi-
dence test outlined in Blockburger. No expression of legislative intent in
the criminal statutes would be necessary if Congress only would enact its
own same-evidence test, duplicating the test already "enacted" by the
102. See 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (Supp. V 1987).
103. Id. § 994(p).
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Court. In view of the sentencing uniformity and proportionality goals
that Congress has given the Commission, the answer seems clear. Con-
sidering the probable policy objectives of equitable distribution of punish-
ment according to culpability,1°4 the results that the same-evidence
approach would yield probably would not comport fairly with these
goals.
Two broad categories of offenses, prepatory offenses and enforce-
ment offenses, help to illustrate this point.105 Prepatory offenses include
attempts, solicitations, and conspiracies. 10 6 The guidelines "group"
prepatory offenses with substantive offenses for sentencing purposes. 10 7
Assuming that Congress approves of the approach taken by the Commis-
sion guidelines, it seems reasonable to infer congressional intent to pro-
vide double jeopardy protection against aggregated punishment for both
prepatory offenses and corresponding substantive offenses.
Enforcement offenses, as defined for this analysis, are those created
not so much to protect against literal violations of their terms as to pro-
vide the government the means to monitor and to prevent or detect, and
successfully prosecute, substantive crimes, or to allow the government to
prosecute a "second-best" offense when firm evidence of a substantive
crime is out of the government's reach. Such provisions arguably in-
clude, for example, the federal mail fraud 08 and wire fraud 0 9 statutes.
Looking at the mail and wire provisions, one plainly sees that they
are designed to prevent fraud. While society has a clear interest in pro-
tecting the orderly function of the means of communication, whether a
letter or wire communication contains an attempted fraud has no more
effect on this function than does an innocent advertisement. The general
federal fraud prohibition requires proof of a willful falsification or con-
cealment of a material fact. 110 The mail fraud section, however, requires
only proof that the defendant devised or intended to devise a scheme to
defraud and that he, for that purpose, placed or caused to be placed an
item in the mails.1 11 No fraudulent statement need be proved.
In addition, the mail fraud provision operates to confer federal juris-
diction over crimes that may be only local in effect, so long as the mails
are used. Consequently, when state or local prosecution is impossible for
evidentiary reasons or is unsuccessful at trial, federal prosecution re-
104. See supra note 101.
105. The guidelines do not use the terms "prepatory" and "enforcement" in this context.
106. The American Law Institute proscribes convictions for both a substantive offense and
its preparation. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.07 (1985).
107. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
108. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982).
109. Id. § 1343.
110. See id. § 1001.
111. Id § 1341; see United States v. Outpost Dev. Co., 552 F.2d 868, 871 (9th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied Germaine v. United States, 434 U.S. 965 (1977).
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mains an option. 112 Since fraud already is prohibited, the mail fraud stat-
ute seems targeted primarily at providing an alternate avenue of
prosecution. In this vein, the guidelines manifest an intent that enforce-
ment offenses should be "grouped" with substantive offenses to preclude
consecutive terms of imprisonment. For instance, the guidelines require
that when a defendant is convicted of two counts of mail fraud and one
count of wire fraud in furtherance of a single scheme, the offenses are
"grouped." 113 To the extent that Congress would agree with the Com-
mission's rejection of a same-evidence approach, one could not expect
Congress to intend a same-evidence approach to define "the same
offense."
(2) Alternatives
Assuming that Congress would not always intend the result reached
by a same-evidence test, at least for prepatory and enforcement offenses,
the question turns to how Congress should express an intent contrary to
that which Blockburger's application would discover. This Note pro-
poses that the Sentencing Commission be delegated the task of defining
"the same offense" in much the same manner as it treats the multiple
offense question in the guidelines and proposes a framework for the anal-
ysis. A preliminary question, however, is whether there are more appro-
priate means.
One alternative would be to enunciate in a separate statute a general
principle of statutory interpretation. Under Minnesota's scheme, for ex-
ample, when the conduct in question constitutes more than one offense,
the defendant will be sentenced only according to the terms of one of-
fense. 114 The relevant factors in determining unity of conduct are "unity
of time, place and criminal objective."'1 15 While this hybrid of the same-
transaction and same-objective tests probably better achieves the end of
emphasizing culpability, it suffers from the infirmities of those tests as
112. The successive prosecutions in this case would not violate the double jeopardy clause
as interpreted by the Court because Blockburger also applies to the multiple trial prohibition of
the clause. See, e.g., Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 166 (1977). Moreover, even if they were
the "same offense," the double jeopardy clause has been held to not preclude a state prosecu-
tion following a federal one and vice versa. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 316-22
(1978).
113. FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 72, at 3.15.
114. MINN. STAT. § 609.035 (1987) provides in part: "[I]f a person's conduct constitutes
more than one offense ... the person may be punished for only one of the offenses and a
conviction or acquittal of any of them is a bar to prosecution for any other of them."
For discussion and criticism of this statute, see generally Note, Multiple Prosecution and
Punishment of Unitary Criminal Conduct-Minn. Stat. § 609.035, 56 MINN. L. REV. 646
(1972).
For similar statutes, see NEW YORK PENAL LAW §§ 70.25(2), 80.15 (McKinney 1987)
and CAL. PENAL CODE § 654 (West 1988).
115. Bangert v. State, 282 N.W.2d 540, 546 (Minn. 1979).
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standards for judicial review.11 6 That is, whether conduct should be di-
vided into separate transactions may depend more on the offense in ques-
tion than on unity of time and place. One would expect that a person
who commits two deliberate murders at substantially the same time and
place would be punished separately, while a person who is found driving
a car that he stole one week earlier should not be punished for both steal-
ing and driving the car. Moreover, the "same-objective" aspect of the
test may require judges and juries to attempt mind reading.
(3) Sentencing Guidelines Approach
Perhaps the better approach would begin with a set of fundamental
principles for identifying "the same offense" and examine each criminal
provision in relation to every other criminal provision with an eye to-
wards harmonizing the crimes with the principles. This analysis is the
basic approach of the sentencing guidelines, directed toward a different
purpose.
Many of the concepts fundamental to an application of this process
in the double jeopardy context have been detailed in other texts1 17 and
some have long been part of the scholarly discourse of criminal jurispru-
dence in the United States and elsewhere.118 Some of these tenets, as
outlined in broad terms by Professor Kirchheimer, include "alternativ-
ity," "specialty," and "consumption or subsidiarity." 1 9 Alternativity
addresses the inconsistent verdict problem, when a defendant cannot pos-
sibly be guilty of both crimes for which he is convicted. 120 The "spe-
cialty" principle would preclude convictions for both a general offense
and a specialized offense. This rule would apply to "necessarily-in-
cluded" offenses and to predicate offenses. 121 Thus, robbery is a neces-
sarily-included offense of bank robbery and the underlying felony would
be a predicate offense of felony-murder. In neither context is this princi-
ple uniformly accepted. Missouri v. Hunter1 22 authorized cumulative
116. See supra notes 73-80 and accompanying text.
117. See generally Kirchheimer, supra note 12 (summarizing various principles and ap-
proaches to the protection from double jeopardy).
118. kd; Labatut Glena, DERECHO PENAL TOMo 1158-60 (7th ed. 1976) (discussing sub-
jective and objective approaches to distinguishing between unitary offenses and multiple of-
fenses); THE GERMAN DRAFT PENAL CODE E 1962, at 5-17, 49 (Fred B. Rothman & Co.
1966) (defending against American criticism the centrality of German notions of guilt in Ger-
man criminal law; providing that multiple crimes arising from one act shall give rise to only
one punishment); THE ITALIAN PENAL CODE 27-31 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1978) (prescrib-
ing rules for sentencing of multiple offenses).
119. Kirchheimer, supra note 12, at 516-18.
120. See ia at 517 (manslaughter necessarily precludes murder and vice versa).
121. Id. at 517-18. A predicate offense is one of two or more possible underlying offenses.
Compound offenses are those such as RICO violations that arise from two or more predicate
offenses that are, themselves, completed offenses.
122. 459 U.S. 359 (1983).
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punishment in the context of a necessarily-included offense, while Chief
Justice Rehnquist appeared to question a restraint against punishment
for predicate offenses. 123 The guidelines, for many offenses, operate to
implement this principle in practice.
The consumption and subsidiarity principle is certainly the most ig-
nored among those articulated by Professor Kirchheimer. This principle
generally requires the merger of prepatory offenses with the completed
offense and the merger of subsequent acts consequentially related to the
primary offense. 12 4 Professor Kirchheimer proffers, as an example of the
latter situation, the case of a cattle thief who subsequently re-brands the
stolen cattle. "[I]t does not seem fair to punish the thief twice: the first
time he is punished for the act of usurping a right; if afterwards he acts as
if he were the legitimate proprietor, he is apparently being punished for
the exercise of a function the illegitimate usurpation of which has already
been the basis for his prior punishment." 125
Professor Kirchheimer's consumption and subsidiarity principles
suggest the same-objective test. This test, however, is not a viable judi-
cial standard. Besides problems regarding codification of such a test and
leaving the courts and juries to determine the specifics,12 6 this approach
necessarily would invite considerable judicial legislating, perhaps with re-
sults wholly unintended by Congress. Instead, the better solution would
make the same-intent or same-objective concept the guiding principle be-
hind a broad evaluation of the double jeopardy implications of federal
criminal provisions.
This proposal would serve two aims necessary to give fair meaning
to the double jeopardy clause. First, the analysis would focus on the
mens rea involved in a given provision and, using that guidepost, it
would determine what constitutes "the same offense." Second, the evalu-
ation would set forth these findings so that the courts are not forced to
resort to circumstantial evidence of legislative intent or talismanic rules
of construction. The evaluation would result, not in a "grouping" of of-
fenses, but in a determination that, under given circumstances, multiple
offenses merge to become one offense, thereby fulfilling the plain intent of
the double jeopardy clause that a defendant not be placed twice in jeop-
ardy for what, realistically viewed, is the "same offense."
123. See Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 708-12 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(arguing that a predicate offense should be distinguished from a lesser-included offense for
double jeopardy purposes).
124. See Kirchheimer, supra note 12, at 518-22.
125. Id. at 520 (drawing from People v. Kerrick, 144 Cal. 46, 77 P. 711 (1904)).
126. See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
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(4) The Structure of the Evaluation
The overall inquiry requires two predicate analyses: the societal in-
terest question and the identity-of-objective question. The first step in
the societal interest question examines a given provision and determines
its, general function. It looks to the substantive danger to society against
which the statute principally protects. Legislators should be mindful at
this juncture of the distinction between enforcement offenses and sub-
stantive offenses and should make this determination realistically, avoid-
ing the temptation to create substantive interests for enforcement
purposes. Next, one should ask whether there is a reasonably foreseeable
scenario in which someone might, in the same act, transaction, or occur-
rence, violate both the statute in question and another statute.127 If so,
the next issue is whether the second statute as applied in conjunction
with the first is directed toward the same substantive danger or a differ-
ent danger.
At this point the identity-of-objective question enters the analysis.
Under the scenario being scrutinized, the legislative body should deter-
mine what objective factors might indicate that the offender intended to
accomplish two or more criminal objectives by her act. One important
factor may be the question of whether, according to the scheme intended
in the scenario, both or all offenses are necessary to accomplish the
scheme.128 When one offense is unnecessary, this factor indicates
(though not conclusively) separate intents and separate crimes warrant-
ing separate punishment. This situation would occur, for example, when
an unnecessary assault is committed in the course of a robbery.
Another circumstantial indicator of separate objectives might be
when the offender is guilty of both an enforcement offense and its corre-
spondent substantive offense, and the facts indicate that she attempted to
conceal the enforcement offense. This conduct would indicate that the
offender knew of both offenses and intended to commit both. 129 Apply-
ing this rationale, for example, to the mail-fraud and substantive-offense
combination (assuming mail fraud to be an enforcement offense, as the
127. One helpful measure would consolidate all offenses under one title. (Federal offenses
are currently scattered across at least 19 separate titles of the United States Codes. See gener-
ally United States Codes Annotated, 1988 General Index, under "Crimes and Offenses.") Pro-
visions could be cross-referenced to other titles to avoid unwarranted duplication of
definitions, schedules, procedures, etc. Not only would this modification simplify the re-evalu-
ation process, but it would be very useful to lay people (and lawyers as well) who, if presumed
to know the criminal law, should at least be able to find it.
128. This analysis is akin to a same-evidence test except that it applies against the indict-
ment or information rather than against the offenses in the abstract. See Whalen, 445 U.S. at
694 n.8; id at 708-12 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
129. Arguably, this factor raises an ignorance-of-the-law defense. As argued supra, how-
ever, in a close case the emphasis should lie in the mens rea. See supra note 73 and accompa-
nying text. This point is particularly relevant with respect to regulatory offenses.
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guidelines seem to suggest), indicators of dual intent may be available
when the offender uses bogus addresses or mail drops or takes care to
send mail from various zip codes in order to evade detection by postal
inspectors. A related factor in finding dual intents may be the case when
the offender has been charged previously with the offenses in question
and possesses particular awareness of the multiplicity of crimes involved.
This approach is more specific to the offender than that used in the
guidelines. While the guidelines tend to "group" certain offenses regard-
less of the intent of the offender, this approach allows for multiple of-
fenses when the offender so intended.
The overall analysis then proceeds as follows. If the identity-of-ob-
jective analysis yields two or more offenses, the determination is conclu-
sive of separate offenses regardless of whether the offenses are designed to
protect the same societal interests or different ones. When the identity-
of-objective analysis reveals only one objective and the offenses guard a
single societal interest, then only one offense results. When one objective
is found and the provisions that have been violated protect distinct inter-
ests, the analysis must turn to a qualitative evaluation of the interests
under the circumstances. The offenses in the usual case are both substan-
tive wrongs, raising a presumption of compounded mens rea, thereby
warranting consecutive conviction and punishment. When the question
is close as to whether the societal interests are distinct, however, a legisla-
tive judgment might favor finding one offense. Thus, for instance, a legis-
lature may face the question of whether a prohibition against making a
false statement to a governmental agency protects a sufficiently distinct
societal interest to warrant further punishment when the statement is
given to effect a tax or welfare fraud.
Finally, of course, the findings must be articulated. To a large ex-
tent, the intent can be expressed directly in the statutes themselves, par-
ticularly when two offenses are either to be separated or merged under all
circumstances. When the analysis is more complex, such as when an
extensive listing and explanation of particular distinguishing factors is
required, or when examples would be helpful, the legislative intent might
be better left to advisory notes such as those provided in the Federal
Rules of Evidence or the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Alterna-
tively, the entire analysis could be set forth, in the model of the sentenc-
ing guidelines, in a text of double jeopardy guidelines.
Conclusion
The review of the Supreme Court cases treating the double jeopardy
clause's protection against multiple punishment dramatically reveals two
facts. First, at this juncture the Court appears to have firmly declined to
search far and wide for legislative intent in addressing the cumulative
conviction and punishment issues. Instead, when in doubt, it will apply
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the Blockburger same-evidence test. Second, given this judicial disposi-
tion, the responsibility for insuring that this constitutional protection has
substantive meaning ultimately rests upon legislators.
Toward this end, Congress and the states must undertake an exten-
sive analysis of the criminal provisions and clearly determine under what
circumstances consecutive punishment is to be authorized for the various
combinations of offenses that arise from unitary conduct. For the federal
criminal statutes, the United States Sentencing Commission would be an
appropriate body through which to initiate this process. The spirit of
fairness behind the double jeopardy clause invites state legislatures to in-
stitute similar commissions for the study of how to best articulate legisla-
tive intent regarding criminal punishment. To comport with the
fundamental aims of the clause and of the criminal law, the guidepost for
these determinations must be the intent of the offender. Singularity of
intent must translate to singularity of offense.

